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Richard Bett 
Johns Hopkins University
SAGP: APA Pacific Division, Berkeley, March 1997
The traditional picture of Pyrrhonian scepticism looks something like this. The sceptic 
assembles opposing arguments on as wide a range of topics as possible. On placing the 
arguments, on any given topic, in confrontation with one another, he discovers that they 
have the feature of isostheneia, "equal strength"; the arguments on one side, he finds, 
incline him towards acceptance no more and no less than those on the other side. This 
isostheneia also has a counterpart in the "unresolvable disagreement" (anepikritos 
diaphonia) that he takes to exist, on any topic you care to name, among philosophers - and 
perhaps among ordinary people as well. Faced with this unresolvable disagreement, and 
with his own perception of the "equal strength" o f the arguments, the sceptic finds him self 
suspending judgement about the real nature o f the objects under discussion. If this 
approach is applied sufficiently broadly - and the sceptic certainly professes to apply it 
across the board - the result is an entirely general suspension of judgement (<epochê) about 
the real nature o f things. This suspension of judgement does not prevent things' striking 
the sceptic in certain ways rather than their opposites; honey tastes to him sweet, for 
example, rather than bitter - at least, if he is not suffering some disease that affects his taste 
buds, or any other unusual physiological or psychological state. But though he will 
register the fact that honey tastes to him that way, and will allow this fact to shape his 
behavior, he will not take it as in any way indicative of honey's real nature; on that question 
the existence of equally powerful opposing arguments has driven him to withdraw from 
any position. Yet this global suspension of judgement about the nature o f things itself has 
an important practical effect; it results in ataraxia, "freedom from worry" - the very goal that 
philosophers, whether sceptical or not, were generally presumed to be seeking. M ost 
philosophers think that they can attain this tranquil state by discovering the truth about 
things. But the sceptic sees that it is precisely that ambition that produces turmoil, and that 
ataraxia is to be attained, on the contrary, by relinquishing any such pretensions.
This picture o f Pyrrhonian scepticism is by no means simply false. It, or 
something close to it (for naturally enough, there is room for dispute about some o f the 
details) is the outlook presented by Sextus Empiricus in his Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism. W hat 
is far more questionable is whether this picture can be said to represent Pyrrhonian 
scepticism as a whole. Besides Sextus, the most important figures in this history are 
Pyrrho himself, who lived some five hundred years earlier, and Aenesidemus, who, some 
two centuries before Sextus, saw in Pyrrho a model to follow and initiated the tradition o f 
thought, based in some sense on Pyrrho's ideas, to which Sextus later belonged. Both 
Pyrrho and Aenesidemus are, for us, relatively shadowy figures; but in both cases, there is 
enough evidence for us to arrive at some fair conjectures about their philosophical 
outlooks. The question is whether these outlooks are essentially the same as the one 
expressed in Sextus' Outlines o f Pyrrhonism.
The answer traditionally given has tended to be "yes"; the views of Pyrrho and 
Aenesidemus have been seen as incipient versions of that of Outlines o f Pyrrhonism  - not 
as fully worked out, perhaps, and not as sensitive to possible objections, but nonetheless
2recognizable specimens o f the same outlook1. Recently, however, this reading has come 
under attack. A number of scholars, including myself, have argued for interpretations o f 
Pyrrho's thought which make it look substantially different from that o f Outlines o f
Pyrrhonism2; and others have done the same, plausibly in my view, with Aenesidemus3. 
If it is correct to see Pyrrho and Aenesidemus in some such new light, then instead of a 
single Pyrrhonist position, we are faced with three different positions. Moreover, I have 
argued elsewhere that the outlook of the reinterpreted Aenesidemus is to be found even in
the work of Sextus himself4. Sextus' Against the Ethicists, I hold, offers a position 
distinct from that of Outlines o f Pyrrhonism, but essentially the same as that of 
Aenesidemus. If all this is so, then Outlines o f Pyrrhonism  represents not the Pyrrhonism 
which had been present in the tradition all along, but a particular, late phase in the history 
of Pyrrhonism - a history which encompasses at least three distinct views at different 
periods.
But the more one claims to detect differences among various Pyrrhonist views, the 
more an obvious problem presents itself. If  Aenesidemus' view is distinct from Pyrrho's, 
why did he consider him self to be following in Pyrrho’s footsteps? If  Sextus' view (most 
o f the time) differs from Aenesidemus’, how can he regard him self as a member o f the 
same tradition? And if  Sextus in Against the Ethicists offers a view essentially the same as 
Aenesidemus', and in Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism  a quite distinct view, how can he cheerfully 
refer to the holder o f both o f these views as "the sceptic"? To put it most generally, how 
could both Aenesidemus and Sextus see themselves as Pyrrhonists, if  they differ both 
among themselves and from Pyrrho?
The problem is perhaps not as serious as it is sometimes made out to be, by those
who want to retain a more unitary picture o f Pyrrhonism5. Aenesidemus is never recorded 
as claiming to promote precisely the views earlier held by Pyrrho. He is said to describe 
him self as "philosophizing in the manner o f Pyrrho" {kata Purrôna philosophôn), and to 
refer to himself and his associates (whoever they may have been) as "the followers o f
Pyrrho" {hoi... apo Purrônos)6; but this need indicate no more than a general similarity of 
approach. As for Sextus, his one comment on the philosophical common ground between 
himself and Pyrrho is notably cautious and notably vague; the sceptical movement is called 
Pyrrhonism, he tells us, "from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have approached
scepticism in a more bodily fashion and more manifestly than those who preceded him"7. 
Then again, Sextus refers to Aenesidemus relatively infrequently, and rarely in any detail. 
Moreover, in a number of these places he appears to present him not as a sceptic, but as an
interpreter, or possibly even an adherent, o f dogmatic views8; in such cases, not
1 See, e.g., Charlotte Stough, Greek Skepticism (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1969); and for a defense of 
the traditional picture o f Pyrrho against rival accounts, M.R. Stopper, "Schizzi Pirroniani", Phronesis 28 
(1983), 265-97.
2 See, e.g., F. Deeleva Caizzi, Pirrone testimoniante (Naples, 1981); G. Reale, "Ipotesi per una 
rilettura della filosofía di Pirrone di Elide", in G. Giannantoni, ed., Lo scetticismo antico (Naples, 1981), 
245-336; Richard Bett, "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 12 (1994), 
137-81.
3 See Paul Woodruff, "Aporetic Pyrrhonism", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6 (1988), 139- 
68; R.J. Hankinson, The Sceptics (London/New York, 1995), ch.7.
4 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, translated with commentary and introduction by Richard 
Bett (Oxford, 1997); also Richard Bett, "Sextus' Against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism or Both?", 
Apeiron 27 (1994), 123-61.
5 See, e.g., Julia Annas, The Morality o f Happiness (New York/Oxford, 1993), p.203, n. 8.
6 Photius, Bibliotheca 169b26-7, 170a22-3.
7 PH 1.7.
8 PH 1.210, 3.138, M  7.349, 350, 8.8, 9.337, 10.216, 233.
surprisingly, there is no question of Sextus' claiming philosophical common ground with 
Aenesidemus.
But these observations do not make the problem disappear altogether. The use of 
Pyrrho as a figurehead by both Aenesidemus and Sextus implies that both saw some 
continuity in the tradition. If the views of all three thinkers were in fact distinct, we need to 
try to pin down what continuity there nevertheless was, or at least what continuity they 
might have thought that there was. In what follows, I shall sketch the views of Pyrrho and 
Aenesidemus, as I understand them, indicating the differences between them, and between 
each of them ^nd the view expressed in Outlines o f Pyrrhonism. I shall then try to indicate 
how the transition between one view and the next might nonetheless have naturally taken 
place.
I
Interpretation of the views of Pyrrho centers inevitably around a short excerpt from the Peri 
Philosophias of the Peripatetic Aristocles of Messene, preserved in quotation by Eusebius
in his Praeparatio Evangélica9; this purports to be a summary of an account of Pyrrho's 
views by Timon of Phlius, his disciple and biographer, and it is the only surviving passage 
claiming to describe Pyrrho's most general philosophical attitudes. One might have hoped 
that this crucial evidence was not fourth-hand. However, there is no reason to doubt
Eusebius' claim to be quoting Aristocles verbatim10; and both the content o f the passage 
itself and Aristocles' record in summarizing the views of philosophers o f whom we have 
independent evidence encourage the conclusion that we have here an accurate reproduction
of what Timon said11. Given its central importance, the passage has not surprisingly 
received a great deal of attention; and there is nothing resembling a consensus as to how it 
should be read. I shall summarize as concisely as possible the interpretation for which I
have argued in more detail elsewhere12.
The passage presents Pyrrho as responding to three connected questions: 1) what 
are things like by nature? 2) what should our attitude be towards them? 3) what will the 
effect be on those who adopt this attitude? The answer to the third question shows at least 
one similarity with the position adopted in Sextus' Outlines o f Pyrrhonism; the effect - or at 
any rate, one effect - of adopting the appropriate attitude towards things (an attitude itself 
generated by adopting the appropriate view concerning the nature o f those things) is said to 
be ataraxia, "freedom from disturbance". We are told that another effect is aphasia, which 
is less clear; it might refer to something like the later sceptical posture o f "non-assertion"
(this is what aphasia means in most of its few occurrences in Sextus13), or it might refer
more literally to speechlessness. I myself prefer the latter alternative14, but that is a minor 
point. Much more important is how we understand the answers to the first two questions.
9 XIV. 18.1-5. The text occurs as passage IF in A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic 
Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987).
10 XIV.17.10.
11 I have argued for this in "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", sec.VI. It has recently been argued that 
Timon's account is not an accurate reproduction of what Pyrrho said; see Jacques Brunschwig, "Once again 
on Eusebius on Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", in Jacques Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy 
(Cambridge, 1994), 190-211. I have argued against this view in "Hellenistic Essays Translated", Apeiron 
29 (1996), 75-97, sec.HI.
1 -  "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho".
13 PH 1.192, 193, 195, 2.211.
1 4 See "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", sec.IV.
We are told that, in answer to the first question, Pyrrho held that things are "equally
adiaphora and asthathmêta and am pikrita"15. Taken by themselves, these three epithets 
seem capable of being read in two fundamentally different ways: either a) metaphysically - 
that is, as designating properties possessed by things in themselves, or b) epistemologically 
- that is, as describing the cognitive relations in which we stand towards things. Taken in 
the first way, the phrase may be translated "equally indifferent and unstable and 
indeterminate", and the point will be that it is the nature of things to lack any definite 
features; taken in the second way, it may be translated "equally undifferentiable and
unfathomable and undeterminable"16, and the point will be that, whatever features may or 
may not belong to things, we are in no position to say what these features are. The second, 
epistemological reading sounds much more like what we are accustomed to think o f as 
scepticism, and plainly brings Pyrrho into much closer contact with Outlines o f  
Pyrrhonism , than does the first; indeed, the first seems to qualify precisely as what 
Outlines o f Pyrrhonism would call dogmatism - it constitutes a declaration about the nature 
o f things. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the first, metaphysical reading must be the 
correct one.
The decisive reason for thinking so is the clause that follows the one we have just 
been inspecting. The translation of this clause is unproblematic: "for this reason neither our 
sensations nor our opinions are true or false [or, more literally perhaps, "tell the truth or 
lie"]". Given the metaphysical reading of the previous words, the inference here is easy; 
because things are inherently indefinite, our sensations and opinions, which present things 
as having certain definite features, are neither true nor false. They are not true, since reality 
is not the way they present it as being. But neither are they false, since that too would 
require that reality possess some definite features - features which are the negations of 
those that our sensations and opinions portray it as having. If reality is inherently 
indeterminate, things neither are nor are not die way they are represented in our sensations 
and opinions; hence these sensations and opinions are neither true nor false. If, on the 
other hand, we try the epistemological reading of the previous words, the inference 
becomes incomprehensible; we cannot determine the nature o f things, and fo r  this reason 
our sensations and opinions are neither true or false. If we cannot determine the nature of 
things, the obvious inference concerning our sensations and opinions would seem to be 
that we cannot say whether they are true or false; it is quite unclear how we could be 
entitled to infer that they are neither true nor false. At this juncture some have tried to save 
the epistemological reading by altering the text, changing dia touto, "for this reason" to dia
to, "because"17. The direction o f the inference is now reversed; the point about sensations 
and opinions becomes a reason fo r  the claim concerning the nature o f things, not a 
consequence of that claim. But this does not help the epistemological reading. For the 
proposition that our sensations and opinions are neither true nor false does nothing to 
support the conclusion that we cannot determine the nature o f things. In fact, the inference 
is still just as bizarre as before; to say that our sensations and opinions are neither true nor 
false presupposes that we are in a position to make at least some statements about the nature 
o f things. Again, if  the point was that we could not tell whether our sensations and 
opinions were true or false, the inference would be easy enough; but again, that is not what 
the text says.
15 XIV.18.3.
16 With one exception ("undifferentiable" for "indifferent"), I here borrow the translation of Julia 
Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes o f Scepticism (Cambridge, 1985), p. 11; Annas and Barnes support 
the epistemological reading.
17 The emendation was originally proposed, without explanation, by Eduard Zeller {Die Philosophie 
der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, 4th edn., ed. Eduard Wellman, iii/1 (Leipzig, 1909), 
501); it has recently received support from Stopper, "Schizzi Pirroniani", p.293, and Annas, The Morality 
o f Happiness, p.203.
5I conclude that Pyrrho's answer to the first question is that things are in themselves 
indeterminate; that our sensations and opinions are neither true nor false is a readily 
understandable inference from this. The text continues by saying, again understandably 
enough, that for this reason we should not trust our sensations or opinions, but should be 
without opinions18; and with this begins the answer to the second question, what our 
attitude towards things should be. This attitude receives its most precise formulation in 
another difficult series o f words: the appropriate attitude is to be expressed by "saying 
about each single thing that it no more is than is not or both is and is not or neither is nor is
not"19. Now, this complicated phrase has often been read as offering us three alternative, 
and somehow equivalent, ways o f speaking about things: we should say, of any given 
thing, either 1) that it no more is than is not, or 2) that it both is and is not, or 3) that it
neither is nor is not20. But it seems that this cannot be right. For if  our sensations and 
opinions are neither true nor false, it cannot be appropriate for us to say about things that 
they both are and are not, or that they neither are nor are not, o f some particular
character21; for these assertions clearly would presuppose that certain sensations or 
opinions were true or false. If a certain object is both red and not-red, then the sensation or 
opinion that the object is red is true, not neither true nor false; if  the object is neither red nor 
not-red, then that sensation or opinion is fa lse , not neither true nor false.
A better way o f reading the phrase, and a way which is just as consistent with the 
Greek, is to take it as offering us just one (compulsory) four-part way of speaking; we are 
to say, of any given thing, that it no more 1) is than it 2) is not or 3) both is and is not or 4) 
neither is nor is not. No one o f these four possibilities, that is, obtains any more than any 
o f the others. Now, if  things are in their real nature indeterminate, this is perfectly correct; 
each of the four possibilities holds "no more" (and, for that matter, no less) than any o f the 
others in the sense that none of them either holds or does not hold. In this way what we 
say "about each single thing” really does reflect the claim about the nature o f things that 
was offered in answer to the first question.
Notice that I have assumed that ou mallon, "no more", is used in the same normal, 
natural way as in ordinary Greek. To say "A ou mallon than B" (where A and B are 
propositions) is simply to say that A holds, or is the case, to no greater extent than B. In 
Outlines o f Pyrrhonism Sextus proposes that by "A no more than B" he will mean either
"why A rather than B?" or "I do not know whether A or B"22; in other words, the term ou 
mallon is used to express suspension o f judgement as between the alternatives A and B. 
But, as Sextus indeed admits23 *, this is quite at odds with the natural usage of the term; and 
there is no reason to suppose that it is being used, in the present passage, in this peculiar 
redefined fashion. In any case, if  I am right in opting for the metaphysical reading of the 
answer to the first question, suspension of judgement between the four possibilities 
mentioned here would be quite irrelevant to Pyrrho's purpose; the point is to fashion a form
18 If our opinions were simply false, we could o f course deal with this by switching to a contrary set 
of opinions; since they are neither true nor false - but purport to be true - we can avoid misconception only 
by refraining from opinions altogether.
19 XIV.18.3.
20 See, e.g.. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers vol.I, p.15; Caizzi, Pirrone, p.104.
21 I here assume that among the possible uses o f esti, ”is", covered by the phrase in question is the
predicative use, with any arbitrary predicate to be supplied; in other words, that "is" stands (perhaps among
other things) for "is...", where the gap may be filled with any predicate - or, as we would say nowadays, "is 
F” (for any F). This is a common use of esti in philosophical Greek; for a brief justification o f its 
applicability to the present context, see "Aristocles on Timon on Pyrrho", p.163.
PH 1.188-91. 
PH 1.191.
of speech which reflects the intrinsic indeterminacy of things, not one which reflects 
epistemological caution on our part.
The nature o f things, then, is indeterminate; our sensations and opinions are 
therefore not to be trusted; and we should speak about things in a way that is faithful to 
their inherently indeterminate nature. And if we do this, to return to the answer to the third 
question, we will achieve ataraxia, "freedom from worry". A great many questions might 
be raised about this account. But it is at least clear that Pyrrho’s thought, on this account, 
is substantially different from the view offered in Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism.', though 
connections between the two views are not non-existent, the earlier view would clearly not 
qualify as a form of scepticism by the standards of the later. Little o f the other evidence 
relating to Pyrrho bears directly on the picture just laid out; most of it consists simply of 
illustrations o f Pyrrho’s extraordinary ataraxia. But there is one passage in Diogenes 
Laertius' life of Pyrrho which seems to fit nicely with the Aristocles passage, as I have 
explained it. Pyrrho, according to Diogenes, "said that nothing was either fine or ignoble, 
just or unjust; and that similarly in all cases nothing was so in reality, but that people do 
everything by convention or habit; for each thing is no more this than that"24. Here again, 
we appear to have an assertion of the indeterminacy of things, as well as the use of the term 
"no more" in a phrase expressing that indeterminacy. We also have some indication of 
how, given the indeterminacy of things, human life might have been thought possible; even 
though reality in itself has no action-guiding features - because it has no determ inate, 
features at all - there is also "convention and habit", which can serve as a basis for 
decisions about how to act. This last point is not echoed by anything in the Aristocles 
passage, but neither is it inconsistent with anything in that passage.
Π
For the views of Aenesidemus, we are also heavily dependent on a single passage whose 
credibility is by no means immediately obvious. In this case the passage is from the
Bibliotheca, or Library, o f Photius, the ninth-century Patriarch of Constantinople25. 
Photius writes two or three pages summarizing Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonist Discourses 
(.Purrôneioi Logoi) - a work also referred to by Sextus - followed by some very brief and 
largely dismissive criticism; and this is by far the most extensive surviving passage devoted 
directly to the description of Aenesidemus' views. It might well be wondered whether a 
late, hostile and non-philosophical source such as this should be taken seriously.
However, comparisons between the language of the Photius passage and language 
employed in numerous briefer allusions to Aenesidemus in Sextus and in Diogenes, as well 
as comparisons between this passage of Photius and his summaries o f some other books, 
suggest that Photius is taking good care to keep his summary objective, and that frequently,
at least, he is employing Aenesidemus' actual words26. Besides, the view Photius 
ascribes to Aenesidemus is internally coherent, philosophically interesting, and clearly 
comparable to ideas that appear periodically in Sextus and in Diogenes - not always, 
admittedly, under the name o f Aenesidemus, but often as characteristic o f Pyrrhonism more 
generally. The view that emerges, however, is again noticeably distinct from that o f the 
official program promoted by Sextus' Outlines o f Pyrrhonism.
Aenesidemus is said to maintain that the Pyrrhonist "determines nothing" (not even 
that nothing is determined), and is "free from all dogma"; by contrast, the Academics o f his 
day - probably Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon - are accused of being
25 169bl8-17la4. With the exception o f Photius' critical remarks, this text occurs as passages 71C 
and 72L in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers.
26 On this, see Karel Janácek, "Zur Interpretation des Photius-Abschnittes über Aenesidemos", Eirene 
14 (1976), 93-100.
7"dogmatic"27. As a result o f determining nothing, the Pyrrhonist is said to be happy,
whereas dogmatic philosophers are said to be exercised by "ceaseless torments"28; the 
happiness in question is not specifically described as ataraxia, but the contrast with the 
dogmatist's situation at least suggests that this is how Aenesidemus conceives o f the 
Pyrrhonist's more desirable state. So far, then, there is nothing to which the Sextus of 
Outlines o f Pyrrhonism  could object. But the stance of "freedom from dogma" is 
apparently compatible, in Aenesidemus' eyes, with a good deal that Outlines o f Pyrrhonism 
would not countenance. The Pyrrhonist is said to assert that things are "no more of this 
kind than that, or sometimes o f this kind and sometimes not, or for one person o f this kind,
for another not o f this kind, and for someone else not even existent at all"29. By itself, o f 
course, "no more o f this kind than that” - or, in contemporary philosophical parlance, ”no 
more F than not-F", where F stands for any arbitrary predicate - might be read as 
expressing suspension of judgement as between the alternatives F and not-F; as we noted 
earlier, this is how Sextus explains the term "no more" in Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism. But the 
other phrases - sometimes F and sometimes not-F, F for one person, not-F for another, 
and non-existent for a third - express not suspension o f judgement, but certain types o f 
relativity. Things are not invariably F, the point seems to be, but F in certain circumstances 
and not in others; this is not suspension o f judgement about whether or not things are really 
F, but the confident assertion that things are F only in a  relative or qualified sense. In order 
to make Aenesidemus consistent, it seems that the "no more" must also be read not as 
expressing suspension o f judgement, but as qualifying the claim that things are F; things 
may be in a certain sense F, but to no greater extent than they are not-F - for each 
alternative, there are circumstances in which that alternative obtains, and circumstances in
which it does not30. Aenesidemus is thus recommending three closely related ways o f 
speaking; and notice that again, as in the case of Pyrrho, the term "no more" has its natural 
usage, rather than the special definition it receives in Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism. But the term 
is nonetheless employed to make a different point from the one we associated with Pyrrho; 
"no more F than not-F", for Aenesidemus, expresses not the indeterminacy o f things, but 
the relativity of properties to circumstances. Aenesidemus accuses the Academics of
making assertions "unambiguously" (<anamphibolos)31; this apparently refers to their 
failure to relativize or qualify their assertions in the way just discussed.
Yet the passage also represents Aenesidemus himself as making a number o f 
negative assertions which would seem to be thoroughly "unambiguous". Aenesidemus is 
said to argue that signs - that is, observable phenomena affording reliable inferences to the 
unobservable features o f things - "do not exist at all"32; he is described as "refusing to 
concede that anything is the cause o f anything"33; and he is said to have argued that there is
27 170all-12, 169b41, 169b39.
28 169b22-9.
29 170al-3.
3 0 Another possibility is that the point is this: things are "no more" F than not-F in that, in their 
real nature, they are neither (the least bit) F nor (the least bit) not-F. As we shall see in a moment, this . 
point is entirely complementary to the reading given in the main text; indeed, the two readings are really 
just opposite sides o f the same coin. It is worth noting that Diogenes Laertius (9.75) mentions that "no 
more” may be used either positively or negatively - "A no more than B" is true if  A and B either both 
obtain or both fail to obtain - and says that the sceptics use it negatively; this may be a case where 
Diogenes preserves an element of Aenesidemus' Pyrrhonism rather than the later variety represented in most 
of Sextus' writings.
31 169b40, 170a29.
32 170M2-14.
33 170M8-19.
simply no such thing as the telos, the ethical end34. How is this consistent with his ban on 
assertions made "unambiguously"? And how is either this or the relative or qualified 
assertions that we have seen he admits consistent with his claim to "determine nothing" and 
to be "free from all dogma"?
The answer, I believe (and this idea is not original with me)35, has to do with a 
certain conception of what it is for something to be by nature, or in reality, a certain way. 
According to this conception, an object is by nature F only if  it is F invariably - F for all 
people and in all situations. Thus an object which is F only sometimes, or for some 
people, is thereby not by nature F. This does not mean that one cannot refer to it as F on 
those certain occasions; it means that, when one is doing so, one is not ascribing to it any 
features which belongs to its nature. I have elsewhere referred to this as the Universality 
Requirement36. The Universality Requirement certainly has precedents in Greek 
philosophy; Plato clearly subscribes to it - and I shall say a little more about this later - and
at least for the concepts of good and bad, so do the Stoics37. Now, there is no certain 
evidence that Aenesidemus accepted the Universality Requirement. But there is a passage 
o f Sextus, reporting Aenesidemus' ideas, which at least seems to come very close to doing
so38; and if  we assume that he did accept this Requirement, the questions just posed 
receive satisfactory answers. To restrict oneself to relative or qualified assertions is thereby 
precisely to refrain from any claims to the effect that things are by nature any particular 
way; it is only when one starts speaking "unambiguously", as the Academics allegedly do, 
that one’s words have the force of attributing features to things by nature. Nor are the 
claims that there are no such things as signs, causes, or the ethical end claims to the effect 
that anything is o f any particular character by nature. Aenesidemus is prepared to deny that 
anything is by nature a sign, a cause or an end; or at least, his conclusions about signs, 
causes and ends may very easily be read in this way. But this is not to assert that anything 
is by nature a non-sign, non-cause or non-end; for in order for those assertions to be true, 
by the Universality Requirement, things would have invariably to be not signs, not causes 
or not ends - which Aenesidemus may again very easily deny. The denials that anything is 
a sign, a cause or an end, then, are not examples o f "unambiguous" assertions. Finally, to 
"determine nothing" is to refrain from positing that any feature holds of anything "by 
nature"; both Aenesidemus’ denials and his relativized assertions are consistent with this. 
And so, incidentally, is the Universality Requirement itself; an assertion about what it is for 
something to be F by nature is not itself an assertion to the effect that anything is F by 
nature.
The Photius passage also frequently reports that, according to Aenesidemus, certain
things are beyond our grasp, beyond our knowledge or beyond our apprehension39. This 
too seems to be distinct from the position of Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism, which specifically 
distinguishes Pyrrhonism from the assertion that things cannot be known (an assertion 
associated by Sextus, rightly or wrongly, with the Academics), holding that this is as much
a violation of sceptical principles as the assertion that things can be known40. But 
Aenesidemus' negative remarks about our knowledge can be readily understood in light of 
the preceding points. If it is only "unambiguous" specifications o f the features of things 
that are of the right type to be specifications o f the natures of those things, and if  we are in 
no position to issue any such "unambiguous" specifications, then it is quite correct to say
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that we are cut off from knowledge - that is, knowledge of the nature of things. It is true 
that Aenesidemus is also reported as saying that the Pyrrhonist:, unlike the Academic,
claims neither that everything is inapprehensible nor that everything is apprehensible41.
But this too should probably be read as a point about the nature of tilings - we are not in a 
position to assert that things are o f such a nature as to be either apprehensible or 
inapprehensible; this is quite compatible with our in fact being cut off from apprehension of 
them, and with our being in a position to say so. Sextus reports a puzzling statement of 
Philo o f Larissa, Aenesidemus' probable contemporary, that as far as the nature of things 
themselves is concerned, things are apprehensible (whereas as far as the Stoic criterion is
concerned, they are inapprehensible)42; Aenesidemus is no doubt responding to this by 
refusing to attribute either apprehensibility or inapprehensibility to things in their own 
nature.
The position attributed to Aenesidemus by Photius can also be detected - or at least, 
aspects of it can be detected - in a number o f places in Sextus and in Diogenes. Both 
authors preserve versions of a set o f Ten Modes, or standardized forms of sceptical
argumentation, that are attributed to Aenesidemus43. Now, Sextus’ official presentation of 
the workings of these Modes, in Book I of Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism, conforms to the pattern 
one would expect from that book; the Modes assemble sets o f opposing appearances 
which, according to Sextus, strike one as having "equal strength", and so one is forced to 
suspend judgement as to the real nature of the objects of which these are the appearances. 
However, as commentators have noticed44, we not infrequently find, even in the Ten 
Modes as presented by Sextus himself, an emphasis on relativity, and on the contrast 
between how things are relatively speaking and how they are absolutely or by nature - the 
latter state being deemed inaccessible to us because our awareness is restricted to instances
of the former45. This seems at odds with appeals to an unresolvable conflict among 
appearances; but it seems thoroughly compatible with the kind o f approach that we have 
seen from the Photius passage to be characteristic o f Aenesidemus. Moreover, even when 
Sextus does introduce the notion o f unresolvability, it is often, or even usually, in 
connection with considerations derived from another set o f Five Modes, attributed to a
certain Agrippa and belonging to a later phase o f the Pyrrhonist tradition46. The notion o f 
unresolvable conflict, that is, tends to be associated with material that cannot originally 
have belonged in Aenesidemus’ Ten Modes; this adds weight to the supposition that, as 
Aenesidemus himself presented them, they expressed a different outlook, one akin to that 
which occurs in the Photius passage. Finally, the Ten Modes as presented by Diogenes - 
who seems clearly to be drawing for his account o f Pyrrhonism on sources other than
Sextus47 - nowhere mention the notions o f "equal strength" or unresolvability, but are, as 
far as I can see, wholly interpretable along the lines suggested by the Photius passage.
But the strongest evidence of a version of Pyrrhonism distinct from that o f Outlines 
o f Pyrrhonism  occurs in Sextus' own Against the Ethicists, a book from one o f his other 
two surviving works. Sextus does not tell us in Against the Ethicists that he is reproducing
41 169b42-170al.
42 PH 1.235.
43 PH 1.35-163, Diogenes Laertius 9.79-88; Sextus attributes them to Aenesidemus at M  7.345.
44 Annas and Barnes, The Modes o f Scepticism; Gisela Striker, "The Ten Tropes o f Aenesidemus", in 
Myles Bumyeat, ed.. The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London), 95-115.
45 PH 1.132, 134, 140, 144, 163.
46 PH 1.60-1, 88-90,114-17,121-3. The Five Modes are attributed to Agrippa by Diogenes Laertius 
(9.88); Sextus (PH 1.164) says that they come from "the later sceptics", by contrast with "the old«· 
sceptics" (PH 1.36) who are responsible for the Ten Modes.
42 On this point, see Jonathan Bames, "Diogenes Laertius IX 61-116: The Philosophy of  
Pyrrhonism", Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt II 36.6,4241-4301, esp. 4250-6,4268-70.
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the views o f Aenesidemus; he expresses agreement with Aenesidemus on one specific
point48, but that is the only mention Aenesidemus receives. However, the view expressed
in Against the Ethicists - or at least, in the first o f its two major parts49 - is in all essentials 
the same as the one Photius attributes to Aenesidemus. Again, the term "equal strength"
(isostheneia) nowhere appears in Against the Ethicists50. Sextus argues not that we should 
suspend judgement about what, if anything, is really good or bad, but that nothing is
really, or by nature, good or bad51; and this definite negative conclusion is one to which he 
is committed in his own person, since he presents its acceptance as crucial to the attainment
of the sceptic’s goal of ataraxia52. He also presents the sceptic as referring to things as
good or bad in the same relative or qualified manner discussed earlier53. And his argument 
for this position includes an explicit mention of what I have called the Universality
Requirement54. Finally, as in the Photius passage, all this is assumed to be consistent 
with the refusal to "make determinations" (or, as Sextus also puts it, with the suspending
of judgement)55; again, the refusal to "make determinations" must here mean, and can 
unproblematically be taken as meaning, the refusal to issue any specifications of the way 
things are by nature - a refusal with which, given the Universality Requirement, the denial 
that anything is by nature good or bad and the accompanying assertion of relativities are 
quite consistent.
in
We have, then, three different outlooks instead of one; Outlines o f Pyrrhonism represents 
not Pyrrhonism as a whole, but the final phase o f Pyrrhonism. But, as noted at the outset, 
this raises questions about the continuity among the three phases. Aenesidemus, the 
initiator o f the second outlook, saw him self as in some sense following in the footsteps of 
Pyrrho, the holder o f the first outlook; and the author of a work entitled Outlines o f  
Pyrrhonism must have seen him self as following in the footsteps o f Aenesidemus, by 
whom the term "Pyrrhonist" seems to have been coined. How, then, are we to explain the 
transitions between these phases?
I shall begin with the transition between Pyrrho and Aenesidemus. The central 
difference between the two views is that Pyrrho advances the thesis that reality is 
indeterminate, whereas Aenesidemus refuses any attempt to specify the nature of reality. 
Both are prepared to assert, for a very wide range of predicates, that things are to no greater 
extent F than not-F; but in Pyrrho's case this is best interpreted as a way o f stating the 
inherent indeterminacy of things, whereas in Aenesidemus' case it is best interpreted as 
saying that things may be either F or not-F, depending on the circumstances - but that in 
their real nature, given the Universality Requirement, they are neither.
The link between the two may be better understood, I believe, if we ask why 
Pyrrho held that reality is indeterminate. The Aristocles passage does not tell us this (it
48 M  11.42.
49 The final portion o f the book (M 11.168-257) is almost entirely distinct in subject-matter from the 
portion that precedes it. It is probable that these two main portions derive from different sources, and it is 
possible that they derive from different phases in the history of Pyrrhonism; on this, see my commentary 
on Against the Ethicists.
50 The term "unresolvable disagreement" (anepikritos diaphônia) does appear (M 11.229, 230), but
only in the second major part; see the previous note.
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does not, after all, purport to be a complete account o f Pyrrho's views, but to be giving
only the "main points", kephalaia)56. But it is a fair conjecture that the main reason must 
have been observations concerning the many varied ways in which things strike people at 
different times, or different people at the same time; reality cannot have any determinate 
nature because there is no fixed way in which the world presents itself to us. Purely in the 
abstract, it is hard to imagine that such observations did not play some role in his arriving at 
this thesis. But more tellingly, perhaps, a number of philosophers before Pyrrho had 
already drawn metaphysical consequences from observations concerning variability; 
Heraclitus, Protagoras and Plato had all done so, and so perhaps had Democritus. The 
notion that variability creates difficulties for any straightforward, commonsense view of the 
world was certainly rife in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C..
One earlier text in particular seems to be relevant to our concerns. In a well-known 
passage o f the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates criticize what may be called a "thesis o f total
instability"57. The thesis is ascribed to some unidentified followers o f Heraclitus58; it also 
appears to be presented as what Protagoras, with his "man the Measure" doctrine, is
ultimately committed to59 *. In any case, according to this thesis, everything is constantly 
changing in every respect; and Socrates' objection is that if  this is so, nothing can even be 
coherently described - language as a whole becomes impossible, except perhaps for a
peculiar form of words, oud'houtosfi0 (translated "not at all thus" in the Bumyeat/Levett .
translation61), that is apparently designed precisely to signal that there is no particular way 
things are. In the Theaetetus, this consequence is presented as a  reductio o f the thesis o f 
total instability. But one can easily imagine others, such as Pyrrho, being attracted to the 
notion that things are radically unstable and accepting, on the basis o f the types o f 
considerations Socrates offers, that at least as regards the real nature o f things, nothing 
definite can be said; indeed, Pyrrho's expression "no more is than is not or both is and is 
not or neither is nor is not", used to signal the utter indefiniteness o f things, might well be 
seen as an improvement on the obscure form of words "not at all thus". In order for this 
position to be sustainable, there must also presumably be some way of using language that 
does not purport to describe the real nature o f things - a point not envisaged in Socrates' 
criticism; but we have good reason to suppose that Pyrrho was aware o f this point. Timon, 
Pyrrho's follower, is reported to have said "That honey is sweet I do not affirm, but I agree
that it appears so"62, which suggests that right from the earliest form of Pyrrhonism, just 
as in its latest form, the application of language to appearances was conceived o f as 
legitimate, separable from its application to the real nature o f things, and usable as a basis 
for choice and action.
Nothing that I have said so far requires that Pyrrho actually knew the Theaetetus, or 
other works o f Plato; I am simply suggesting that Pyrrho's thought may have run along 
lines similar to those o f Socrates' criticism o f the thesis of total instability, while drawing 
from this train o f thought an entirely different moral. However, it is at least tempting to go 
further, and to speculate that aspects o f his view, including the use o f the term "no more" 
itself, may actually have been suggested to Pyrrho by Plato's writings. The term "no
more" occurs several times in the passage criticizing the thesis o f total instability63. But it 
also occurs in other dialogues as part o f Plato's own characterization o f the sensible world.
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At the end o f Republic Book V, for example, things in the sensible world are said to be "no
more" large than small, light than heavy, etc.64 - because for any such pair o f opposite 
predicates, there are circumstances in which each of the two applies; and this is taken to 
show that nothing really is either large or small, light or heavy, etc.. Republic Book V 
does not suggest a thesis o f total instability concerning the sensible world - merely a thesis 
o f lack o f  total stability with regard to any predicates, which, because o f Plato's adherence 
to what I called Universality Requirement, disqualifies sensible things from really being 
any particular way. But passages in other dialogues suggest that Plato was at times
attracted to more extreme theses concerning the instability of the sensible world65; and for 
this reason it has been suspected by some scholars that in the Theaetetus, Plato is indulging 
in some self-criticism. In any case, if  Pyrrho did draw inspiration directly from Plato, it 
may have been from the Theaetetus, through a paradoxical acceptance of what Socrates 
presents as a reduction but another possibility is that the inspiration was much more general 
- that Pyrrho found plausible something like Plato's view o f the sensible world, as 
suggested in the Republic and related dialogues, but rejected Plato’s hypothesis of 
separated Forms which give the sensible world a kind o f vicarious stability or definiteness.
Much of the last couple o f paragraphs has been highly speculative. But even if the 
suggestion of an influence from Plato on Pyrrho is overbold, the points just raised at least 
make clear that the intellectual climate in the period immediately preceding Pyrrho was 
highly congenial to someone being impressed with the variability or instability o f things, 
and inferring from that variability or instability a radical thesis concerning the nature of 
reality. Now, if  variability or instability was indeed the driving force behind Pyrrho's view 
that reality is indeterminate, and if  this was made clear in the writings of Timon, to which 
Aenesidemus may be presumed to have had access, then it is not too hard to explain how 
Aenesidemus could have seen him self as following in Pyrrho's path, despite the 
differences noted earlier.
As we saw, variability - or as I put it, relativity to circumstances - was also central 
in Aenesidemus' outlook. But in Aenesidemus' day, it would have seemed thoroughly 
irresponsible to derive from this any positive characterization of the nature of reality, such 
as that it was indefinite. The Stoics and the Academics had been engaged in a couple of 
centuries of debate on epistemological issues, in which the legitimacy of claiming to be able 
to specify how things really are, on the basis o f how they strike one - and the dangers of 
trying to do so when they strike one in conflicting ways - was central throughout. Anyone 
familiar with the history o f those debates - and the Photius passage shows that 
Aenesidemus was familiar with them, whether or not he was himself ever a member of the
Academy66 - would naturally be very cautious about any pretensions to specify the real 
nature of things. Because o f his acceptance of the Universality Requirement, Aenesidemus 
is prepared to make suitably relativized assertions; but these, precisely because they are 
relativized, do not count as assertions concerning the nature of things. Though doubts 
about our ability to say how things really are had certainly been broached by Pyrrho's time, 
they had nowhere near the centrality in philosophical discourse that they were to acquire in 
the Hellenistic period; given the different eras in which they lived, it is not surprising that 
the same kinds of observations about the variability in how things strike us might have led 
Pyrrho to a bold thesis to the effect that reality is inherently indeterminate, and 
Aenesidemus to a withdrawal from any attempts to "determine” - that is, to specify - the 
nature of things. But despite this important difference, Aenesidemus is still holding on, if I
64 479b5-6.
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am right, to much of the same outlook as Pyrrho. As a result of similar observations 
concerning variability, both refuse to trust our everyday impressions of things as revelatory 
of how those things really are; to express that refusal, both adopt forms o f words including 
phrases of the type "no more F than not-F"; and both claim that as a result o f that refusal, 
one can achieve a trouble-free existence, whereas philosophers who adopt other 
persuasions and procedures are perpetually troubled.
If one takes the final Pyrrhonist position - the one offered in Outlines o f  
Pyrrhonism - as being what the term "scepticism" properly refers to, there is a clear sense 
in which Aenesidemus is closer to scepticism than Pyrrho is. But now, given the 
epistemological debates that occurred prior to Aenesidemus, the surprise, if  anything, is 
that he is not closer still. For one thing, the Universality Requirement, as a criterion for 
something's being by nature a certain way, seems a surprisingly unsceptical item for 
Aenesidemus to accept. Although, as noted earlier, the Universality Requirement does not 
itself constitute a specification of how things are by nature - and refraining from such 
specifications is what Aenesidemus' policy o f "determining nothing” may best be seen as 
consisting in - there is a clear sense in which the Universality Requirement would seem to 
qualify as a doctrine, or a philosophical commitment. Secondly - and perhaps because of 
the weight he attaches to the Universality Requirement - Aenesidemus seems surprisingly 
unsceptical about the various types of relative statements that he employs. Something is F 
in some circumstances, not-F in others - and by the Universality Requirement, this shows 
that the object is no serious candidate for being F by nature. However, that the object is F 
in the first set of circumstances, and not-F in the second, is something that Aenesidemus 
does not seem disposed to question. There is no suggestion that one or both of these states 
of affairs might be illusory; though relativity is supposed to create an obstacle to knowledge 
of the object's true nature, doubts about the relativities themselves apparently do not enter 
the picture. Indeed, if the Universality Requirement is to do its work, it seems that such 
doubts had better not enter the picture.
It is not easy to say why Aenesidemus should have been so unsceptical in these 
respects. It is, of course, quite possible that, despite his criticism o f the Academics o f his 
own day for being dogmatic, he himself was not immune from the generally less sceptical 
ethos of the early first century B.C, as compared with the heyday o f the Academy under 
Arcesilaus and Cameades. It is also possible, as has been suggested by other scholars, that 
Aenesidemus was affected by a renewed interest in Plato on the part o f the Academics o f
that period67; perhaps he was impressed with Plato's use of the Universality Requirement, 
seeing it as a means to develop a new method of withdrawing from all "determinations" o f 
the natures of things. We know from Sextus that Aenesidemus took a position on the 
question whether Plato was a sceptic68; this suggests at least an interest in whether Plato's 
writings could be mined for his own sceptical purposes.
However, we cannot hope to advance beyond speculation in this area. W hat I do 
want to emphasize at this point is that if one abandons the Universality Requirement, the 
position adhered to by Aenesidemus becomes unsustainable - and the rather different 
position represented by Outlines o f Pyrrhonism will naturally tend to take its place. As just 
noted, Aenesidemus' acceptance of the Universality Requirement seems in some ways 
peculiar; a successor of his who was struck by this peculiarity, and who refused to accept 
the Requirement, but who wanted to retain a policy of "determining nothing", might well, 
find that one change altering his whole outlook. For suppose one no longer takes it that, in 
order for something to be by nature F, that thing must be F in all circumstances. Then the 
fact that the thing strikes us in some circumstances as F and in others as not-F no longer
67 Woodruff, "Aporetic Pyrrhonism", pp. 165-6; see also Harold Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism ? 
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has any tendency to suggest that the thing is by nature neither F nor not-F; without the 
Universality Requirement in place, there is no particular reason to assume that either one of 
these ways it strikes one is not the way it really is. But nor, o f course, is there any 
particular reason to assume that either one is the way the thing really is. If  one assumes the 
Law o f Non-Contradiction (and this continues to be assumed as securely by Sextus as by 
anyone), the object cannot be in reality both F and not-F; and there is no reason to favor 
one possibility over the other - this point, at least, is common ground throughout the 
history of Pyrrhonism. Thus there will be no particular reason to be for or against either 
one of the possibilities F or not-F; either one might in reality obtain, or it might not obtain. 
In other words, if  one abandons the Universality Requirement, but retains an emphasis on 
the variability with which things strike one, one will tend to arrive at a position according to 
which each o f the various possibilities, concerning how a thing really is, is o f "equal 
strength".
By the same token, the posture o f suspension o f judgement now becomes a posture 
of refusing to commit oneself one way or the other as to whether some given object is in 
reality F. In the Aenesidemus-influenced Against the Ethicists Sextus argues, on the basis 
of ethical variabilities, that nothing is in reality good or bad. If one accepts the Universality 
Requirement, this is consistent with suspension o f judgement, in the sense o f refraining 
from specifications o f how things are by nature. But if  one does not accept that 
Requirement, then the claim that nothing is in reality good or bad would seem to constitute, 
precisely, a specification o f how things are by nature; if  "in reality F" is no longer assumed 
to entail "invariably F", there seems to be nothing to prevent the statement "nothing is in 
reality good or bad" from being taken to entail "everything is in reality other than good or 
bad". Given this, suspension o f judgement can now only consist in a refusal to say 
whether or not any particular object is either good or bad by nature. This is the posture that 
is consistent with there now being two or more possibilities o f "equal strength"; and this is 
the posture that Sextus actually does adopt in the ethical section o f Outlines o f
Pyrrhonism69.
Finally, the term "no more" has to assume a new function, if it is to continue in use. 
"No more F than not-F" cannot be used, as it was by Aenesidemus, as a way o f asserting 
the relativity of things' features to circumstances, and denying that these features hold o f 
the things by nature; for this is not consistent with the new variety of suspension of 
judgement. Rather "no more F than not-F” now has to be used, if  at all, as a way of 
characterizing that new suspension of judgement - that is, as characterizing the "equal 
strength" enjoyed by the various possibilities. Hence, as Sextus says in Book I o f Outlines
o f Pyrrhonism, although the term "no more" "exhibits the character o f assent or denial"70 - 
although it sounds as if  it is to be used for asserting or denying things - he is going to use it 
in a way that is at odds with this natural usage.
The shift from Aenesidemus’ position to that o f Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism makes 
sense, then, if one makes the single supposition that the Universality Requirement came to 
seem problematic - a supposition that seems easy enough to grant, since as we saw, it is if  
anything a problem understanding why Aenesidemus would have been willing to accept it 
in the first place. My conclusion, then, is that both the transition between Pyrrho's 
position and Aenesidemus’, and the transition between Aenesidemus' position and that of 
Outlines o f  Pyrrhonism, may be explained without too much difficulty - and hence that 
there is no fundamental obstacle to the view that Pyrrhonism is not one position, but three 
separate ones. It would surely be surprising if Pyrrhonism had stayed essentially 
unchanged over some five hundred years; that shifts, even important ones, took place over 
such a long period is only to be expected. (Nobody is surprised, for example, when this 
turns out be true o f Platonism.) So long as the shifts can be made historically and
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philosophically comprehensible - and I hope that I have made at least some modest 
progress in that direction - there is no reason to resist the notion that Pyrrhonism 
encompassed several different views over its long and discontinuous lifespan.
